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EXPLORING THE POLITICAL SIDE OF BOARD INVOLVEMENT IN STRATEGY:  A 
STUDY OF MIXED-OWNERSHIP INSTITUTIONS 
 
Abstract 
 
Our article reports findings from a comparative study of strategic decision-making and board 
functioning in nine firms. Findings from our study indicate that the heterogeneity of interests 
represented in the board, members’ possession of relevant knowledge, and the presence of ex-ante 
conflict resolution mechanisms combine in shaping if and how board members engage in strategy-
related activities and how strategic decisions are taken. Our findings extend current understandings 
about the strategic functions of the board (monitoring, advice, and resource-dependence), suggesting 
how, under certain conditions, boards may act as negotiation forums where directors search for a 
reconciliation between diverging shareholders’ interests and views. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Research on board involvement in strategy can be largely traced back to two main theoretical 
approaches, namely a strategic choice perspective and an agency perspective (Rindova, 1999). 
While the former focused on the capacity of board members to contribute to the development and 
refinement of strategic decisions (e.g. Tashakori and Boulton, 1983; Carpenter and Westphal, 
2001), the latter examined how boards could prevent managers from developing corporate strategies 
that privileged their own interests at the expense of the shareholders’ (e.g. Boeker and Goodstein, 
1993; Baysinger and Hoskisson, 1990).  
Collectively, these studies have considerably advanced our understanding of how and why 
boards of directors engage in strategy-related activities. Critical reviews of research on board 
involvement in strategy, however, have raised concerns about the tendency of extant research to 
oversimplify the structure of decision making in boards (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999) and about its limited capacity to capture the nuances of political issues surrounding 
strategic decisions (Pettigrew, 1992), and they have called for further explorations of the context and 
the process of board involvement in strategy (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999; Rindova, 1999). 
Following this call, in this article, we report findings from a comparative study of board 
functioning and strategic decision making in nine boards of mixed-ownership institutions – i.e. 
companies where two or more stockholders own large shares of the capital – a research setting 
selected with the explicit aim of increasing the visibility of social and political dynamics surrounding 
strategic issues. Evidence from our study suggests that variables of cognitive (members’ possession 
of relevant knowledge) and political nature (heterogeneity of represented interests, presence of ex-
ante conflict resolution mechanisms) combined in explaining if and how board members engaged in 
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strategy making and how strategic decisions were taken. Different configurations of board 
involvement seemed to arise in response to different combinations of these variables.  
Our findings highlight the influence of the represented interests on board involvement in 
strategy and explore the conditions under which this occurs. In doing so, they provide empirical 
support to the theoretical arguments in favor of the adoption of a political perspective to the study of 
board involvement in strategy, in addition to the more popular lines of inquiry inspired by theories of 
agency or strategic choice. In doing so, our findings suggest an enrichment of traditional 
understandings of the strategic functions of the board as a monitoring device, a source of strategic 
advice, and a nexus of environmental linkages for securing critical resources (Johnson, Daily and 
Ellstrand, 1996; Stiles and Taylor, 2001; Zahra and Pearce, 1989). In this respect, evidence from 
our study suggests that in presence of highly diverging interests represented in the board and in 
absence of ex-ante conflict resolution mechanisms, boards may have also a consensus-building 
function, acting as a negotiation forum where a compromise between a set of diverging interests is 
searched for.  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
The strategic choice perspective 
Early research on board involvement in strategy focused on insider representation – i.e. the 
percentage of board members who are current or former employees of the firm – as a significant 
antecedent of board involvement in planning (Tashakori and Boulton, 1983), decision-making (Judge 
and Zeithaml, 1992) and strategic change (Goodstein and Boeker, 1991). Studies in this tradition 
followed what Judge and Zeithaml (1992) called a strategic choice perspective, in that they rested 
on the idea that directors contribute to refine corporate strategy by evaluating corporate plans and 
challenging managers, and by occasionally engaging in the development of strategic alternatives 
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(Andrews, 1980; Demb and Neubauer, 1992; Rindova, 1999). Later studies relied on simplified 
representations of the process – such as Judge and Zeithaml’s (1992) distinction between a 
formation and an evaluation phase – to facilitate survey-based investigation of antecedents of board 
involvement (e.g. Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Westphal and Fredrickson, 2001).  
Recent qualitative research on board dynamics, however, indicates multiple ways in which 
board members may attempt to influence strategic decisions. McNulty and Pettigrew’s (1999) 
exploration of the role of outside directors brought to the identification of three broad types of 
involvement, as outside directors may “take strategic decisions” (as they accept or reject capital 
investments), “shape strategic decision” (as they try to influence the preparation of the proposals) or 
even “shape the content, context and conduct of strategy” (as their influence spans from the 
formation to the implementation of strategies). Later, Stiles’ (2001) field study produced a 
sophisticated account of various activities through which board members influence strategy making, 
from business definition (as they set the vision and the mission of the organization) to gatekeeping (as 
they screen top management’s proposals and they ensure the respect of the current strategic 
framework) and others. Collectively, these findings seem to challenge the capacity of a two-step 
representation of the process such as Judge and Zeithaml’s (1992) to properly describe how board 
members engage in strategy-related activities, and indicate that research on antecedents of boards 
involvement in strategy may benefit from more nuanced and empirically grounded accounts of the 
process.  
 
The agency perspective 
A second line of inquiry has focused on the content of corporate strategies as a good indicator of the 
relative influence of outside directors – as representatives of shareholders – on the outcome of 
  
 
5 
decisions, investigating how board composition and structure are related to R&D spending and 
innovation (Hill and Snell, 1988), diversification (Hill and Snell, 1988; Yoshikawa and Phan, 2005), 
strategic change (Goodstein and Boeker, 1991; Golden and Zajac, 2001), internationalization 
(Tihanyi, Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 2003) and the adoption of governance practices (e.g. 
Mallette and Fowler, 1992; Young, Stedham and Beekun, 2000).  
These studies largely adopted an agency perspective, emphasizing the fundamental conflict 
of interests between shareholders and managers over the content of strategic decisions (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Agency theorists (Fama and Jensen, 1983) consider the board of directors a 
primary mechanism for safeguarding shareholders’ interests from opportunistic behavior of 
executives. Research in this tradition assumed that proper managerial incentives (e.g. Hill and Snell, 
1988; Johnson, Hoskisson and Hitt, 1993) or a powerful board (e.g. Baysinger, Kosnik and Turk, 
1991; Westphal, 1998) would eventually induce managers to select strategies in the primary interests 
of shareholders.  
Building on a theoretical agency framework, scholars inferred conclusions on boards’ 
behavior from the analysis of demographic characteristics of board members, assuming that 
demographic factors could capture their inclination towards strategy in an effective way (Golden and 
Zajac, 2001). Past studies, however, seem to have produced mixed results, as, for instance, inside 
directors were described alternatively as defenders of the existing course of action (Goodstein and 
Boeker, 1991), risk-averse pursuer of diversification strategies (Hill and Snell, 1988) or bold 
supporters of innovation (Baysinger et al., 1991). Furthermore, while these studies generally 
assumed homogenous preferences among shareholders, recent research has highlighted how different 
type of owners (owner-managers, investment funds, pension funds, etc.) may differ in time horizons 
and goals, hence in their attitude towards corporate innovation (Hoskisson, Hitt, Johnson and 
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Grossman, 2002), diversification (Yoshikawa and Phan, 2005) and internationalization (Tihanyi et 
al., 2003). These results indicate that closer examination of the interests represented in the boards 
may further improve our understanding of the institutional and ownership context that affect the role 
of the board and its functioning (Lubatkin, Lane and Schulze, 2001). 
 
Exploring a complementary theoretical framework  
Shortcomings of past studies on board involvement in strategy seem to reflect more general issues 
affecting research on board of directors. Reviews of extant research in the major areas of inquiry 
have revealed little consistency in past results (Dalton et al., 1998; Johnson et al., 1996). While 
some scholars have called for more refined correlational research that placed more attention to the 
influence of less studied, potentially moderating variables (Dalton et al., 1998), others have observed 
how search for parsimony and simplicity might have led researchers to oversimplify the causal chain 
linking governance structures and dynamics to corporate performance, reducing the ability of the 
research method to detect the influence of variables not considered in the design phase (Pettigrew, 
1992; Forbes and Milliken, 1999), and leading to overlook the complexity of processes embedded 
in a web of multiple and diverging interests (Stiles and Taylor, 2001). As McNulty and Pettigrew 
observed, there seems to be a “need to get closer to boards and directors to collect primary data 
about processes of contribution, power and influence (1999: 52).”  
While it would be incorrect to claim that research on board involvement in strategy has 
totally overlooked issues of power and interests, with few exceptions (Hill, 1995; McNulty and 
Pettigrew, 1999; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995; Stiles, 2001), most researchers have largely relied 
on the simplified assumptions of the agency framework and have rarely investigated the actual 
interests shaping the interaction between board members and managers. Yet, the idea that the 
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process and outcome of strategic decisions are partly shaped by the specific interests is central to 
one of the main research traditions on decision-making – i.e. a political perspective on strategy 
(Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). 
This school of thought highlights the fact that, in organizations, coalitions of people may have 
competing interests as regards the outcome of strategic decisions (Pettigrew, 1973 and 1977). In this 
respect, strategic decisions are not just about finding rational solutions to technical or economic 
problems: insofar as they imply a distribution of resources, they tend to be affected by political 
processes where actors with partially diverging interests attempt to influence their outcome (Allison, 
1971; Hickson et al., 1986; Pfeffer and Salancik, 1974). Strategy formulation, then, can be 
considered as a partly boundedly rational and partly political process (Hickson et al., 1986). The 
various interests involved affect strategic decisions insofar as they find a formal or informal way – 
such as representation in the board – to exert influence on the process. 
Past research on decision making has investigated the conditions that affect the likelihood 
that organizational units engage in power struggles over the allocation of resource (e.g. Hills and 
Mahoney, 1978), as well as the determinants of the relative power of each subunit (e.g Pfeffer and 
Moore, 1980; Salancik and Pfeffer, 1974). While later studies observed how an excess of political 
behavior – i.e. focus on personal interests and use of power – may reduce the effectiveness of 
decision making, to the extent that it may divert attention from organizational goals and from the 
feasibility of the adopted solutions given the environmental constraints (Dean and Sharfman, 1996), 
and it may fail to gather the support required for effective implementation (Floyd and Woolridge, 
1992; Nutt, 1987), research in this tradition converges on the idea that political behavior is an 
intrinsic feature of organizational decision-making (Crozier and Friedberg, 1995).  
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A political approach to strategy, then, questions the validity of analyses based on universal 
assumptions, and emphasizes how the outcome of strategic decisions depend on a broad context, of 
which the internal political system is a fundamental component (Pettigrew, 1977). Therefore, 
understanding the process and the outcome of strategic decisions requires a careful analysis of the set 
of interests that have the power to influence the focal decision (Crozier and Friedberg, 1977; 
Hickson, 1987). In this view, studies of board involvement in strategy would benefit from a 
preliminary analysis of the set of interests that are represented in the board, and of the relationships 
of cooperation and competition that connect the various shareholders. 
RESEARCH METHOD 
In order to benefit from both the richness and realism of longitudinal, grounded studies and the 
robustness of a comparative approach, our study relied on multiple-case design (Yin, 1984; 
Eisenhardt, 1989a) and adopted a “synthetic strategy” to the analysis of process data (Langley, 
1999). In other words, we compared evidence across several cases, searching for discernible 
patterns and for plausible antecedents of the observed differences, trying to discriminate between 
local contingencies and more general regularities (Eisenhardt, 1989a; Crozier and Friedberg, 1995). 
 
Research setting 
Our study was conducted on nine large firms. The selection of cases relied on theoretical sampling 
(Miles and Huberman, 1994). We focused on what we could refer to as “mixed-ownership 
institutions” – i.e. firms whose ownership is distributed between a few actors, none of whom controls 
the majority of the votes, and at least some of whom have other exchange relationships with the 
organization (being a supplier, a customer, a manager, a competitor, etc.) and therefore are likely to 
have multiple interests in the firm’s conduct rather than mere profit-maximization. Our assumption 
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was that the inherent complexity in the ownership configuration of these types of firms would have 
made political processes more visible and therefore easier to study (Pettigrew, 1990). 
Combining various public sources, we compiled a list of the 500 largest industrial, 
commercial and service companies in the country, ranked by sales. For 492 of them, we managed to 
gather detailed qualitative and quantitative information about the ownership structure. Data came 
from various sources including the Stock Exchange, the local Chambers of Commerce, the financial 
press, and the companies’ websites. The ownership structure of fifty of them corresponded to our 
theoretical requirements (not fragmented, but neither concentrated in the hands of a single majority 
owner). Thirty-four of these companies were excluded a priori because family ties or other personal 
bonds among shareholders increased the likelihood that business-related processes might be blurred 
by overlapping social dynamics related to kinship, friendship, obligation, tradition, etc. The remaining 
sixteen companies were contacted and nine out of sixteen agreed to participate to our research (see 
details in Table I).  
------------------------------- 
Insert Table I about here 
------------------------------- 
 
 
Data collection 
Following a recent call to investigate “both the content and the process of board involvement in 
strategy” (McNulty and Pettigrew, 1999, p. 51), our study followed an embedded design (Yin, 
1984). First, an analysis of shareholders’ interests and of the multiple relationships between the 
former and the company provided the contextual information required to properly understand the 
observed processes. Next, we examined board activities in order to understand what type of 
strategic issues where brought to the attention of the board. Finally, in order to understand the 
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processual side of board involvement, we investigated instances of strategic decisions: how they 
started, how they unfolded and how a final agreement was reached.  
Following prescriptions for case-based research (Yin, 1984), company data were collected 
from different sources: archival research in the business press and other secondary sources, and 
semi-structured interviews with members of the board. 
Archival research: preliminary archival research in business magazines and other secondary 
sources (websites, corporate directories, annual reports and other publicly available corporate 
documents, etc.) helped us draw a company profile and trace the company’s recent history. As 
customary in inductive research (Locke, 2001), data collection followed emerging insights. After 
preliminary analysis indicated a possible influence of shareholders’ agreements on board members’ 
involvement in strategy, we also collected copies of the company by-laws from the local Chambers 
of Commerce in order to gather more precise information about the institutional context of decisions. 
As insights from the cases indicated that the knowledge and expertise of board members could 
contribute to explain board behavior, further search helped us identify the professional background 
of most board members or their position in the mother companies. Then, following previous research 
(Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 1986; Hillman, Cannella and Paetzold, 2000), board members were 
tentatively categorized according to their presumed strategic role as insiders (i.e. current officers of 
the firm), decision controllers (i.e. shareholders’ representatives, whose primary role was to ensure 
that decisions safeguarded the interest of the former), business experts (former executives or current 
officers in other firms in the same or related industries) and support specialists (lawyers, bankers, 
accountants or other professionals, occasionally providing specialized expertise on specific issues), 
or a combination of the above. Archival data were triangulated with information collected in the 
interviews, which increased our confidence in the reliability of our assessment. 
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Semi-structured interviews. Archival research helped us prepare semi-structured 
interviews, aimed at collecting detailed information on boards’ involvement in strategic decisions. For 
each company, we interviewed at least two members of the board (see Table II). The selection of 
our informants was aimed at collecting data from directors which (a) were in a good position to be 
informed about board behavior and involvement in strategy, and (b) represented different 
shareholders – in order to capture different views on board-related issues and reduce the risk of 
collecting a biased representation of board dynamics (Friedberg, 1993).  
Typically interviews lasted between one and a half and two hours. In order to ensure 
reliability, both researchers were present at all the interviews. Given the content of interviews, at 
times we were not allowed to use a tape recorder. However, detailed notes were collected and, 
soon after each interview, they were compared, merged and transcribed. Following Miles and 
Huberman’s suggestion, transcriptions were supplemented by contact summary sheets, reporting 
essential data, key issues arising from the interviews, as well as insightful quotations that could help 
future theorizing. 
We initially asked our informants about their company, their industry and their strategy. In a 
second part of the interview, we asked them to illustrate the ownership structure, and, in order obtain 
a clearer representation of each shareholder’s interests in corporate activity and performance, we 
asked them to indicate if shareholders had other relationships with the company besides 
shareholdings (see Table I). In the third part of the interview, we focused on boards of directors: 
their structure, composition and functioning. We asked our informants to describe typical activities 
during board meetings. In order to obtain a comparable representation of what each board really 
did, we asked our informants to rank board activities according to their relative prevalence inside 
and outside board meetings.  
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The fourth part of the interview investigated strategic decisions. Following a method already 
used in research on decision making (e.g. Eisenhardt, 1989b), for each firm we asked our informants 
to identify a recent major decision that had involved the board and could be considered 
representative of the usual process by which strategic decisions are made (see Table II). We asked 
our informants to trace the story of the decision, trying to distinguish facts and events (how it started, 
who was involved, etc.) from personal observations.  
------------------------------- 
insert Table II about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Data Analysis 
Data analysis combined common methods for grounded-theory building (Glaser and Strauss, 1967; 
Locke, 2001) and comparative case analysis (Eisenhardt, 1989a). Accordingly, data collection and 
analysis proceeded in an iterative way, as new data were gathered in order to test the robustness of 
emerging interpretations about possible explanations of board involvement in strategy.  
In an early stage of our analysis, we carefully examined our informants’ descriptions of board 
activity and strategic decisions, aiming at producing a rich representation of board involvement in 
strategy. First, following prescriptions for grounded-theory building (Locke, 2001), board members’ 
descriptions of board activities were content analyzed, searching for common categories across 
cases. First-order categories were labeled in terms that were as close as possible to the words 
actually used by our informants. In a second round of categorization, cross-case comparison helped 
us group first-order categories in second-order macro-categories illustrating the prevailing activities 
of each board.  
As regards prevailing board activities, a comparison of the rankings produced by members 
of the same board showed consistent agreement, at least as regards the first three positions. These 
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results reinforced our confidence in the reliability of an assessment of the prevalent activities of the 
boards based on the upper part of the ranks – i.e. on the top three activities mentioned by our 
informants. Further cross-case comparison revealed two prevailing configurations, which building on 
Stiles (2001) we labeled as “setting the strategic context” vs. “gatekeeping”, emphasizing the 
prevailing strategic activities performed by the board (see Tables III, IV and V later). The different 
relative importance of strategy-related activities defined what we could call the type of board 
involvement in strategy. 
Next, following past research on strategic decisions (Eisenhardt, 1989b), we merged the 
descriptions of strategic decisions into “decision stories” based on our informants’ accounts. 
Combining multiple perspectives helped us move beyond individual perceptual biases and alleviated 
potential recall problems. Analysis of decision stories helped us investigate the participation of board 
members in the various phases of the decision process. While past research has generally 
distinguished between a formation phase and an evaluation phase (Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; 
Judge and Zeithaml, 1992), our data suggested the adoption of a four-step framework (generation of 
ideas, selection of a course of action, execution, and control) to categorize the scope of board 
involvement, understood as the extent of board involvement in the various conceptual phases of the 
process.  
Finally, as we analyzed strategic decisions, we observed that boards did not differ only in 
their prevailing strategic activities and in their involvement in the various phases of the process, but 
also in the way a final agreement was reached. Building on earlier frameworks, Mintzberg and 
colleagues (Mintzberg, Raisinghani and Théorèt, 1976, p. 258) identified three basic modes for 
choosing among alternative strategic solutions: judgment, analysis and bargaining. Judgment refers to 
decisions made by individuals in their own mind, on the basis of a subjective evaluation of the 
  
 
14 
consequences. Analysis, on the contrary, is based on a rational evaluation of the alternatives, 
supported by factual data and technical tools. Bargaining, finally, produces decisions that mediate 
between the interests of different parties with conflicting goals. Following Mintzberg and colleagues, 
we categorized the prevailing mechanism for decision making for each case. Not surprisingly, 
given the institutional context in which decisions were taken, no board gave primacy to individual 
judgment: while some relied on rational analysis, in others, decisions emerged from intensive 
negotiations among the parties involved. 
Cross-case comparison of boards and board members’ involvement in strategy revealed 
three different patterns of behavior across cases, characterized by different combinations of type and 
scope of board involvement in strategy as well as by the prevailing decision mechanisms. 
Accordingly, we formed three groups of three, two and four cases respectively displaying different 
patterns of involvement in strategy, and we tentatively named their boards as “Type A”, “Type B” 
and “Type C” (see Tables III, IV and V). In a further round of comparative analysis, combining 
within-case analysis with cross-case comparison, we searched for variables that could explain 
differences in the observed patterns across board types. We adopted a comparative logic closer to 
the one described by Eisenhardt (1989a), according to which within-case analysis based on rich, 
often anecdotal, information was used to generate insights to be developed further and tested in 
cross case analysis. We constructed comparative tables to identify discriminating variables that could 
explain similarities and differences in patterns of involvement (summarized in Figure 1).  
Provisional interpretations were developed in an iterative way, as emerging insights called for 
additional data collection and tentative explanations were checked across cases; in this respect each 
case was used to confirm or disconfirm inferences drawn from other cases (Eisenhardt, 1989a). 
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Following Eisenhardt’s (1989a) indications, we referred to the existing literature to refine and enrich 
inductively derived theoretical insights.  
FINDINGS 
The analysis of board activities across the nine cases revealed three different patterns of behavior, 
resulting from different combinations of the type and scope of board involvement – i.e. the 
prevailing strategic activities performed by the board and the relative involvement of members along 
the various phases of the process – and the prevailing decision mechanism.  
------------------------------- 
insert tables III, IV and V about here 
------------------------------- 
 
Some boards, tentatively labeled “Type A”, mainly displayed a moderate involvement in 
strategy making – similar to what McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) described as taking strategic 
decisions (see Table III). In Redaelli Tecna, Tecnologistica and Teknecomp, shares were roughly 
distributed between a top management team, collectively owning up to 30-40%, and various 
institutional and private investors. In these companies, boards evaluated proposals for capital 
investment and controlled the results of their implementation, but left full responsibility for the 
generation, elaboration and implementation of alternatives to managers. The evaluation of proposals 
generally relied on the analysis of the financial implications of strategic or business plans.  
Other boards, named “Type B”, displayed a higher involvement of members in the 
development and refinement of strategic plans, as they would often engage in what McNulty and 
Pettigrew (1999) describe as shaping strategic decisions (see Table IV). In joint ventures Nylstar 
and Polimeri Europa, outside board members – often functional or divisional managers in the mother 
companies – would engage, together with top managers, in the formulation of plans that would later 
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be submitted to the collective discussion. Directors, either individually or collectively, raised issues, 
proposed alternatives and contributed to their elaboration, and sometimes even followed their 
implementation. In other words, board members tended to be involved all along the process. Like in 
Type A boards, however, the evaluation of alternatives relied primarily on rational analysis of the 
proposals submitted to the board, based on financial or industrial considerations. 
Similarly, “Type C” boards displayed a high involvement in all the phases of the decisions, 
and actively shaped goals, policies and decisions (see Table V). Their behavior, however, resembled 
more what McNulty and Pettigrew (1999) described as shaping the content and context of 
strategy. In joint ventures Olivetti Canon Industriale, Telepiù, Italtel and Siemens Nixdorf 
Informatica, outside board members – often ex executives or other business experts – would 
vigorously engage in the elaboration, discussion and refinement of broad strategic plans as well as 
specific business projects. Discussions would be carried out largely outside board meetings, and 
decisions would be brought to the board only after the parties had reached an agreement. Unlike 
Type B boards, decisions would emerge from intense negotiation among managers and board 
members, aimed at developing a solution that would accommodate the interests of the company and 
its shareholders. 
Comparative analysis across cases helped us identify three variables – namely the 
heterogeneity of interests represented in the board, directors’ possession of relevant 
knowledge, and the existence of ex-ante mechanisms for resolving conflicts among 
shareholders – which seemed to combine in explaining much of the observed differences in board 
involvement in strategy-related activities. The resulting explanatory framework is summarized in 
Figure I, highlighting the moderating effect of ex-ante conflict regulation on the relationship between 
the configuration of shareholders’ interests and some aspects of board involvement in strategy, and 
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the possible mediating effect of members’ knowledge between interests and the scope of board 
involvement; a relationship, however, which, in absence of robust evidence from all the cases, is 
tentatively indicated with a dotted line.  
 ------------------------------- 
insert Figure I about here 
------------------------------- 
 
The scope of board involvement 
By scope of board involvement, we refer to the extent to which board members engage in the 
various phases of the decision making process. Three of the observed boards showed a narrow 
involvement in strategy making, focusing mostly on approving or rejecting strategic proposals 
developed by top managers and controlling their realization. The remaining six showed a broader 
involvement in all the phases of the process, including the elaboration and implementation of 
alternative courses of action. 
In Redaelli Tecna, Teknecomp and Tecnologistica, Type A boards generally set quantitative 
objectives (in terms of growth, profitability, etc.), vesting managers with responsibility for strategy 
formulation (see Table III). Plans were initiated, developed and elaborated almost exclusively by the 
managers, although directors were kept constantly informed about the emerging alternatives that 
would later be submitted to the attention of the board. The case of industrial conglomerate 
Teknecomp, summarized by the CEO, is illustrative of the typical early stages of the process:  
The opportunity to sell a subsidiary, a producer of electronic components, was initially brought 
to the attention of the board by a manager of the company itself (…) He had received an offer 
from a large American client. (…) After having informed the board, we [the CEO, the financial 
manager and the general manager of the subsidiary] worked on the project for 6-7 months (…) 
Having reached an agreement with our counterpart, we finally brought the proposal to the board. 
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Type A boards focused mainly on approving or rejecting top managers’ strategic proposals 
and controlling their execution through a rich information flow. Strategic issues would be discussed 
and decisions taken during board meetings, on the basis of the detailed information provided for by 
the management. Decisions would be later implemented by the managers, and their results again 
brought to the attention of the committee and the board. 
In all the other cases – corresponding to the six joint ventures – the involvement of the board 
was broader and the steps were not as well defined: boards, either collectively or through some of 
their members, were often involved in the generation and elaboration of strategic alternatives (see 
Tables IV and V), as they would often delegate members to assist managers in the analysis of issues 
and in the formulation of proposals that would be discussed during plenary meetings.  
At producer of artificial fibers Nylstar, for instance, in order to thoroughly analyze the 
implications of the proposed acquisition of a plant in a former Eastern European country, a joint 
committee including board members and directors was formed (see Table IV). As the chairman of 
Nylstar explained: 
At first sight, the deal seemed attractive, but it was fraught with uncertainties. In order to increase 
our understanding of the pros and cons of the operation, we decided to create a committee that 
would include the general manager and two outside directors, a sales manager and an operations 
manager in the mother companies. (…) The task of the committee was to collect further 
information about the opportunity and to develop a proposal to the board. Its composition 
ensured a broad range of expertise, adequate to the complexity that we perceived in the task.  
 
Rather than simply choosing between different alternatives proposed by the managers, board 
members would take an active part in their development, so that it was difficult to clearly distinguish a 
generation phase and a selection phase. While boards usually took formal responsibility for the 
selection of alternative proposals, decisions were taken to boards’ meeting only after the 
shareholders’ representatives sitting on the committee had analyzed in depth the pros and cons of the 
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alternatives and actively contributed to shape and refine them. Alternatives brought to the board 
would then be discussed, sometimes approved, sometimes rejected. At times, however, outside 
board members would even support managers in the implementation of decisions (see Tables IV and 
V).  
An early interpretation of our findings led us to hypothesize that the observed differences 
could be ascribed primarily to the divergence among the shareholders’ interests that were 
represented in the board. In fact, some of our informants mentioned explicitly how members’ 
involvement in the early stages of the process was often inspired by specific plans of the shareholders 
they represented. Take the case, for instance, of Siemens Nixdorf Informatica, a producer of 
systems and services for office automation, as described by the chairman of the board:  
During a regular board meeting, a representative of one shareholder [Siemens Nixdorf] proposed 
to spin-off the information service business. He proposed to create a new company, which would 
receive all the assets of the venture in the information services. The proposal was clearly inspired 
by the decision of Siemens Nixdorf to increase its presence in that business. The spin-off would 
have facilitated the realization of this plan in our country. 
 
However, while heterogeneous interests seemed to be generally associated with the tendency 
to purposefully attempt to shape the content of decision, within-case analysis did not provide robust 
evidence of a direct causal connection between the heterogeneity of shareholders’ interests and the 
scope of board involvement. 
In the interpretation of our informants, a second variable, namely the possession of relevant 
knowledge, seemed to display a more robust and direct correlation. By relevant knowledge, we 
specifically refer to functional or market knowledge that can be usefully applied to the problem 
solving process implicit in most strategic decisions (Hickson et al., 1986) and is therefore likely to 
enhance the capacity of board members to perform their advisory task effectively (Forbes and 
Milliken, 1999). Further examination of the distribution of knowledge and expertise among board 
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members, because of their professional background or their past experience (see Tables VI and 
VII), seemed to support this emerging interpretation. 
------------------------------- 
Insert tables VI and VII about here 
------------------------------- 
 
In Type A boards, most outside directors had been appointed by institutional investors in 
order to monitor managers’ decisions and safeguard the interest of their appointers (see Table VI). 
In doing that, they primarily performed the role of “decision controllers” (Baysinger and Zardkoohi, 
1986). They were executives of merchant banks or chartered accountants with a background in 
finance or in law, but lacking a deep knowledge of the business. The CEO of Teknecomp generally 
described the competence of outside directors as “generic”. Some of them, because of their 
professional background, occasionally acted as “support specialists” (Hillman, et al., 2000) in that 
they provided specialized advice of financial or legal nature on specific financial operations.  
The potential contribution to strategy formulation of these directors was largely described by 
our informants as low. Their involvement was limited to reviewing plans, probing for more 
information and stimulating their refinement. They demanded a timely and comprehensive flow of 
information in order to be able to control top management’s behavior, even in absence of a strong 
knowledge of the technical and commercial aspects of the business. As a director of Redaelli Tecna 
observed: 
Every time a proposal was advanced, the CEO would deliver a comprehensive documentation 
illustrating the project in the details, including expected economic results, cash flow, etc. (…) He 
would guarantee the business assumptions of the plan (…) we reviewed the analysis of the 
financial aspect of the plan.  
 
In the six joint ventures, instead, most representatives of the partners were functional or 
divisional managers in the mother companies or sometimes ex-managers of the company (see table 
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VII). In other words, most of them qualified as “business experts” (Hillman, et al., 2000). While they 
acted also as decision controllers – or, as the chairman of Olivetti Canon Industriale defined them, as 
“observers” on behalf of the mother companies – they possessed a profound knowledge of the 
industrial or commercial side of the business that enabled them to play a more substantial role. At 
Siemens Nixdorf Informatica, for instance, the chairman observed repeatedly how involvement in the 
various phases of strategy making was facilitated by the expertise of board members:  
Most board members have a deep knowledge of the company and they give an active 
contribution to the development of the strategic proposals (...) Directors give ideas and 
contributions: make questions, ask for further analysis, and suggest future directions. (…) It is 
normal [for board members] to contribute to the elaboration of strategies: some members even 
tend to follow strategic issues more closely, outside board meetings. (…) 
 
By virtue of their background, then, most shareholders’ representatives in the six joint 
ventures were able to bring specific technological, managerial and commercial knowledge to the 
strategic process (see Tables IV, V and VII). Frequent interaction and intense collaboration between 
inside and outside board members was common to the six companies. As a director of Italtel, a large 
producer of telecommunication equipment, explained:  
The fact that all board members are managers – in the joint venture, in the mother companies or in 
some affiliated company – ensures that they all share a profound knowledge of the 
telecommunication industry. Their contribution to board activities, then, is very professional and 
facilitates collaboration between inside and outside directors. 
  
In summary, our evidence seems to support the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The greater the amount of relevant knowledge possessed by board 
members, the broader the scope of board involvement in strategic decisions. 
 
The type of involvement and the mechanisms of decision 
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While Type A and B differed in the relative involvement of board members in the various phases of 
the process, they showed similar patterns of behavior in the prevailing strategic activities of the board 
as a collective unit and in the way strategic decisions were eventually taken. Both types of boards 
showed the prevalence of what Stiles (2001) describes as gatekeeping – i.e. the evaluation and 
screening of strategic proposals advanced by top managers. In Type A and Type B boards, most 
meetings would be dedicated to the analysis of financial results and to the evaluation of capital 
investments and strategic plans. Although in Type B boards, individual members would be 
occasionally involved in refining strategic plans, boards collectively intervened at the end of the 
decision process, discussing and accepting – or rejecting – capital investment proposals formally 
advanced by top managers (see Table IV).  
Selection largely relied on rational and objective analysis of the alternatives supported by 
factual data and financial tools. Top managers would usually submit plans in advance to board 
members, along with extensive information. During meetings, directors would analyze and discuss 
them with managers. At times, they requested modifications or even rejected the plan if the technical 
solutions were not convincing or if the financial implications were unsatisfactory.  
At Teknecomp and Tecnologistica, for instance, managers would illustrate in details the 
implications of their proposals. Although their report would often include both qualitative and 
quantitative information, they would place a particular emphasis on financial aspects, as these seemed 
to be the grounds on which proposals would largely be evaluated (see Table III). Similar patterns of 
behavior were observed also at Redaelli Tecna, as an outside director recalled: 
As usual, we had all received a detailed report a week in advance. During the plenary meeting, the 
CEO presented the alternatives, under different levels of projected sales. (…) Different financial 
ratios were associated to each alternative. (…) I remember we discussed for hours. (…) Eventually 
we approved the investment that, compared to the alternative solutions, was expected to 
influence more positively future cash flows. (…) Redaelli is not the usual small business where 
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you hear ‘I have the impression that if we enter that business…’ We might start with impressions, 
but eventually decisions are guided by expected cash flows.  
 
Rational analysis seemed to prevail also in Type B boards, such as Nylstar and Polimeri 
Europa, where top managers would submit strategic decisions – developed in collaboration with 
some board members – to the board meeting, where the plan would be discussed by all members 
and approved or rejected after having evaluated its assumptions and financial implications for the 
company.  
Type C board members, instead, were highly engaged, both individually and collectively, in 
what Stiles (2001) describes as setting the strategic context for managers’ decisions, as boards 
clearly defined the overall goals and the boundaries within which strategic plans were expected to be 
formulated. In these companies, shareholders vested the board with the responsibility to give 
managers broad strategic directions. In board meetings, much time was spent discussing and defining 
general policies and competitive issues. In fact, as illustrated in Table V, board members did not 
restrict themselves to set general goals, but would often go down the hierarchy of strategic decisions, 
sometimes even having a word in the development of product policies and market strategies.  
Strategic decisions, however, usually emerged from a process of bargaining, in that the 
selection among the available options required mediation between possibly diverging interests among 
shareholders. In Type C boards, when asked to describe the decision process, our informants 
explicitly referred to the necessity to reach a consensus between the shareholders before a decision 
was made (see Table V): strategic decisions were often discussed between shareholders’ 
representatives outside board meetings, and brought to a meeting only after an agreement was 
reached.  
These boards would perform their functions largely outside plenary sessions. At Telepiù, for 
instance, an executive committee composed of representatives of the three partners met frequently to 
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discuss strategic issues later to be brought to the attention of the rest of the board. However, as an 
outside director appointed because of his personal expertise and connections commented, when 
issues touched the interests of shareholders, decisions would in fact be taken outside the board (see 
Table V).  
The difference in the decision modes used by Type A boards on the one hand and Type C 
boards on the other hand seemed to be explained primarily by the structure of shareholders’ interests 
and in particular by a variable we labeled heterogeneity of represented interests, understood as 
the variety and diversity of the stakes represented in the board. In the observed cases, such 
heterogeneity derived from the fact that most mother companies were also engaged in collaborations 
of various kinds (i.e. supply of technology or raw material, purchase of products, etc.) or were in a 
position of direct or indirect competition (see Table I). As a member of the board of digital 
broadcaster Telepiù observed:  
Conflict did not appear in the minutes, but was in the atmosphere and it was due to the diverging 
interests among shareholders. One of them had developed a proprietary technology and found 
itself in a double position, as supplier and client. 
 
When one of the shareholders proposed to upgrade the technological platform of the 
company, being also in the position of potential supplier, tension arose, as one of the co-CEOs later 
recalled:  
 You see, there was no market price for it, no reference. It was a pure negotiation. Bob [the other 
CEO, representing the shareholder-supplier] and I would sit in opposite offices with open doors 
and could talk to each other without even leaving the office. I would also talk frequently to Jan 
[the chairman, representing another large shareholder] and check his reactions (…) and I would 
go back to Bob and say: Look, if you do this, Jan will not be happy (…)  
 
Similarly, at Italtel, conflict was heightened because of the respective positions of the mother 
companies: on the one hand, STET was by far the largest customer of the venture and had an interest 
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in pushing development projects that suited its specific needs, while, on the other hand, Siemens’s 
products would compete with Italtel’s in some foreign markets. As a director told us:  
At times, frictions might arise between the company and its shareholders (…) In some European 
markets we are actually competing with one of the parent companies. For example in Spain we 
would like to increase our market share but the mother company is trying to stop our plans. 
 
In the specific case we analyzed, parent companies had also opposing views on locating the 
manufacturing of a new product, as both companies had interest in the production being carried out 
within their own facilities. Negotiation between board members was required to find a compromise 
between the diverging interests of shareholders.  
In fact, most of our informants mentioned how potential conflicts of interests among the 
shareholders were usually addressed and dealt with outside board meetings, as they often required 
long negotiation among the parts (see Table V). The presence of high officers from the mother 
companies, as directors from Italtel and Siemens Nixdorf Informatica explicitly observed, gave 
boards the possibility to make important decisions that affected the interests of the partners. In 
summary: 
Proposition 2a: Other things being equal, the higher the heterogeneity of 
shareholders’ interests, the higher the likelihood that “setting the strategic context” will be 
the prevailing strategic activity of the board, and that bargaining will prevail as a decision 
mechanism. 
 
 In Type A boards, instead, patterns of conflict were simpler and closer to the traditional 
agency-based representation: managers on one side and pure shareholders (i.e. without contractual 
relationship with the company) on the other. Moreover, managers also owned shares in the company 
and, hence, just like institutional and private investors of the firm, they were interested in maximizing 
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the financial return of the company. Our informants did not mention particular conflicts: minor 
divergence was usually considered easier to solve. As a director at Redaelli Tecna remarked: 
We might have had discussions, but no real problems. (…) Between 1990 and 1996 boards 
decisions had been unanimous. Consensus was easy to reach because interests were convergent. 
In 1996, the board split when the CEO and one of the shareholders, a merchant bank, developed 
opposing views about the decision to go public.  
 
In these cases, the convergence of shareholders’ interests seemed to facilitate the adoption of 
procedural rationality – based on objective evaluation of the alternatives – over political bargaining. 
As the CEO of Teknecomp observed (see also Table III):  
Only once, in my memory, the board denied approval. We shared diverging views about the risk-
return profile of an acquisition, and the majority of board members considered the acquisition too 
risky.  
 
Commonality of interests between investors made it possible for a coalition of shareholders 
to veto managers’ decision, the adequacy of which, then, had to be proven on technical grounds. In 
formal terms: 
Proposition 2b: other things being equal, the lower the heterogeneity of shareholders’ 
interests, the higher the likelihood that “gatekeeping” will be the prevailing strategic activity 
of the board, and that rational analysis will prevail as a decision mechanism. 
 
At first, the fact that Type B boards – corresponding to joint ventures Polimeri Europa and 
Nylstar – shown a behavior similar to Type A boards, seemed to contradict our tentative 
interpretation. Yet further analysis revealed a substantial difference between the shareholders 
agreements of the first and the second group of joint ventures. In these cases, our informants 
mentioned how venture agreements between the partners regulated supply relationships and other 
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potential conflicts of interest in details. These rules offered a framework in the light of which 
managers’ proposals could be evaluated. As CEO of Nylstar told us: 
Joint venture agreements clearly define contributions and supply terms. They offer us a precise 
reference for issues involving a partial conflict of interests. […] 
 
In these ventures, patterns of relationships between shareholders and the ventures seemed to 
be somewhat simpler and limited to supply relationships. Hence it was probably easier to 
circumscribe potential conflicts and regulate them ex-ante. The presence of what we could call ex-
ante conflict regulation mechanisms – i.e. formal agreements that regulated in detail the 
relationships between the parties, reducing the strategic discretion of the board, and consequently the 
range of issues that could possibly be disputed and subjected to negotiation – seemed to contribute 
to the stability of the relationship. In fact, one of our informants at Polimeri Europa reported how the 
occasional revision of the shareholders’ agreement opened the way to negotiations aimed at striking 
a new balance between the conflicting goals of the mother companies. As the CEO observed:  
Occasionally, a shareholder may propose changes to the rules governing the relationships 
between the venture and the mother companies. In these cases, decisions are usually taken 
outside the board, discussed by the shareholders’ representatives and brought to the board only 
after a consensus is reached.  
 
In Type C boards, instead, shareholders seemed to have left resolution of their diverging 
interests mainly to the negotiations between board members. In these cases, carefully designed 
governance structures ensured the “balance”, as one of our informants observed, of the context 
within which decisions matured. At Telepiù, for instance, the board was chaired by a representative 
of the Kirch Group, while two co-CEOs cohabited at the top of the managerial rank: one was 
initially appointed by Fininvest, the founding company, while the second was appointed later by 
Nethold, a new partner in the venture. At Italtel and Siemens Nixdorf Informatica, partners 
appointed an equal amount of directors. The only amendments to the by-laws regarded the rules for 
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electing the chairman. In both cases, amendments gave one of the partners the right to propose a 
person as chairman, and the other the right to accept or refuse. Finally, at Olivetti Canon Industriale, 
ample amendments to the company by-laws conferred to the board of directors – where both 
shareholders were equally represented – exclusive authority over a broad range of business 
decisions, from investing in research and development, to the establishment or termination of licensing 
agreements or any other forms of collaboration between the venture and other parties. Company by-
laws explicitly forbade board members from delegating decisions over these issues to smaller 
committees or the top managers.  
In summary the moderating influence of ex-ante conflict resolution mechanisms on the 
relationship between the heterogeneity of shareholders’ interest and board involvement in strategy 
can be summarized as follows:  
Proposition 3. Other things being equal, the presence of ex-ante conflict resolution 
mechanisms will increase the likelihood of “gatekeeping” as the prevailing strategic activity 
of the board and rational analysis as the prevailing decision mechanisms, even in presence of 
heterogeneous shareholders’ interests.  
 
DISCUSSION 
We believe that our findings contribute to increase our understanding of board dynamics in that they 
(i) substantiate the argument that the adoption of a political perspective may increase our 
understanding of how and under what conditions boards engage in strategy related activities (see 
Table VIII), (ii) suggest an expansion of the traditional classification of board functions, and (iii) 
foreshadow the idea that the salience of the various functions of the board may be contingent upon 
contextual factors.  
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------------------------------- 
insert Table VIII about here 
------------------------------- 
 
A political perspective on board involvement in strategy 
Past research on board involvement in strategy largely relied on an agency or a strategic choice 
perspective. A third line of inquiry on boards of directors adopting a resource-dependence 
perspective (e.g. Pfeffer, 1972 and 1973; Hillman, et al., 2000; Hillman and Dalziel, 2003) pointed 
at the important role of board members in improving the capacity of the firm to collect critical 
resources from the environment, through the co-optation of representatives of resource-holders or 
influential members of the community (Pfeffer, 1972 and 1973). Although this approach seems to 
have been less popular in recent research on board involvement in strategy, it is nonetheless 
important in understanding the strategic functions of the board (see Table VIII). 
While some studies have pointed at the political nature of board dynamics (Hill, 1995; 
Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995), applications of a political perspective to the analysis of board 
involvement in strategy are rare, despite the fact that board membership is a powerful way to 
influence resource allocation processes in organizations (Hickson, 1987). In this respect, our findings 
indicate that if there is a substantial convergence of goals and interests among shareholders, the 
board can be provided with a stable set of goals and guidelines that can be communicated to the 
managers and used to evaluate their proposals. However, increasing heterogeneity of interests 
represented in the board is likely to increase board members’ concerns with the political implications 
of strategic decisions even at corporate or business level. As a consequence, in presence of high 
heterogeneity of interests, boards will tend to rely more on bargaining than on rational analysis or 
judgment, unless potential conflict of interests among shareholders may be regulated ex-ante in 
company by-laws or other formal agreements. These conclusions seem to be applicable to any 
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organizations where ownership structure and/or the company bylaws prevent any single shareholder 
from exercising total control over the board and the company. Conversely, even in presence of high 
heterogeneity of interests, the controlling shareholder might be able to clearly impose its will (goals 
and plans) over the managers, with no need to bargain – unless, of course, the minority shareholders 
could rely on other forms of influence to induce him or her to negotiate. 
Our findings are consistent with recent developments of governance studies that have started 
to emphasize the importance of formal rules in shaping decision making in the board. Past research 
has generally ignored the influence of rules on board dynamics. Recent studies, however, has shown 
how formal rules contribute, for instance, to shape the CEO succession process (Ocasio, 1994 and 
1999). Ocasio’s studies acknowledge the political nature of board dynamics, as the author suggests 
that “rules establish the parameters by which the political game is played” (1999, p. 386). Sociologist 
of power Ehrard Friedberg observes how rules may be used by actors engaged in collective action 
to structure the field of a decision, in order to reduce the autonomy of participants and the possibility 
of making use of their relative power and discretion (Friedberg, 1993). Indeed, as we have shown in 
our findings section, as shareholders preferred to leave a resolution between their diverging views 
and positions to the interaction between board members, they made sure that governance structures 
and board leadership were carefully designed to balance the power and influence of each party.  
As customary in inductive qualitative research, our findings partly reflect and partly extend 
existing knowledge about the phenomenon (Locke, 2001). The idea that members’ functional 
knowledge tends to affect their capacity to effectively perform their advisory function is not new (see 
Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Indeed, consistently with research in the strategic choice perspective 
(Carpenter and Westphal, 2001; Pettigrew and McNulty, 1995), we observed that the scope of 
board involvement in strategy tends to be affected by the background and expertise of board 
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members. Hillmann and Dalziel (2003), however, observe how research in this tradition has largely 
neglected the existence of incentives for board members to engage in an advisory role, and 
encourage scholars to be more sensitive to the actual capacity and motivation of board members to 
contribute to firm performance. In this respect, our findings suggest that the need to actively engage 
in strategy making – in order to advance or safeguard their own interests – might push shareholders 
to appoint knowledgeable managers who could actively shape the content and even the context of 
strategies. Although we have only anecdotal evidence of such intentionality on the shareholders’ side, 
it does not seem unreasonable to argue that while heterogeneous interests may provide an incentive 
for shareholders’ representatives in expanding the scope of their involvement in strategy, it is really 
the possession of relevant knowledge that allows board members to effectively engage in the 
initiation and elaboration of strategic proposals (hence the dotted line in Figure I). 
 
The board as a negotiation forum 
Management scholars (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996; Stiles and Taylor, 2001) tend 
to agree that the most significant functions performed by the board in the strategy making-process 
are (i) monitoring managers’ behavior in order to protect shareholders’ interests, (ii) reviewing and 
evaluating strategic decisions – or, in other words, advising managers’ strategic decisions – and (iii) 
facilitating the acquisition of resources and legitimacy critical to firm’s success (see Table VIII). 
Evidence from our study, however, suggests that past studies might have overlooked a fourth 
important function of boards, namely facilitating the reconciliation of diverging goals and interests of 
represented shareholders. Doing research on large public companies, whose ownership structure is 
assumed to be distributed among shareholders that share the same objective of profit maximization, 
might have led researchers to emphasize the struggle between the opposing interests of managers and 
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shareholders, at the expense of a more sophisticated account of potential differences among the 
interests represented in the board (Lubatkin, et al., 2001; Young et al. 2002).  
In fact, recent studies have acknowledged the potential divergence of interests among 
shareholders, and have started to investigate how it may affect corporate strategies (Hoskisson, et 
al., 2002; Tihanyi, et al., 2003; Yoshikawa and Phan, 2005). In financial economics, a rising stream 
of research addressing what has been termed the “principal-principal problem” is based on the 
recognition that in several European and Far Eastern countries – where the prototypical public 
company of the Anglo-Saxon world is not the prevalent corporate form (La Porta, Lopez-De 
Silanes and Shleifer, 1999) – large pyramidal business groups and high ownership concentration in 
listed companies lead to a potential conflict of interests between controlling and minority 
shareholders, the former being in the potential position to expropriate the latter of part of their value 
through unfair intragroup exchanges and transfers of goods (Faccio, Lang & Yeoung, 2001) 
In this respect, our findings show how in presence of highly diverging interests among the 
shareholders, boards may perform a critical function in facilitating the reconcilement of conflicting 
views regarding strategic issues and the definition of a common set of goals and guidelines to direct 
managerial action. As David Hickson (1987) remarked, boards of directors are a prime social 
mechanism to manage potentially conflicting interests. In this respect, boards are not only a 
monitoring device to safeguard shareholders’ interests from managers’ abuse, but provide the 
context within which convergence between partly diverging goals may be reached, as strategic plans 
are evaluated in terms of their technical rationality and financial viability as well as of their impact on 
the goals and interests of all the represented parties.  
Further research on boards as decision making teams, however, seems to be needed. In a 
related stream of research, Donald Hambrick (1994, 1995) has advanced the concept of 
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behavioral integration, understood as the capacity of members of a top management team to 
exchange information timely and effectively, and to ensure collaborative behavior and joint decision-
making. TMTs and board of directors display considerable differences as regards their composition 
(the strategic apex of the company vs. a variable mix of insiders and outsiders), their leadership 
structure (usually concentrated in the hands of the CEO in TMTs, often distributed and influenced by 
board composition in boards of directors), and their average involvement in strategy (a primary task 
for TMTs, an episodic activity for the average board). However, they can be both conceptualized as 
small decision-making units facing ambiguous tasks, whose relative performance is influenced by their 
capacity to tap individual skills and knowledge and work together towards a common goal 
(Hambrick, 1994; Forbes and Milliken, 1999). Indeed, in some of the cases we observed, some 
outside directors at time acted as informal members of the top management team. Future research 
may investigate more deeply under what conditions boards may really operate as behaviorally 
integrated units.  
 
Towards a contingency approach to board studies 
More research on the relationships between ownership structure, board functions and strategy 
making, however, seems to be needed. By emphasizing the relationships between the configuration 
of shareholders’ interests and the relative salience of the political function of the board as a 
negotiation forum, our findings provide further support to the claim that under different conditions, 
boards may perform different functions and their level of involvement in strategy-related activities 
may vary accordingly.  
The idea that the prevailing functions of the board may be contingent upon contextual factors 
has been recently advanced theoretically (Forbes and Milliken, 1999; Lynall, Golden and Hillman, 
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2003) and seems to have found increasing empirical support. Past research has observed how board 
involvement in strategy tends to increase in times of crisis (Mace, 1971). A recent study of the airline 
industry shows also how changing institutional pressures may lead to changes in board composition 
and structure, in order to adapt to the increased salience of the resource-dependence function 
(Hillman et al., 2000). Conversely, increased market competition may stimulate the adoption of 
more sophisticated practices for evaluating top managers, in response to a rising salience of the 
monitoring function (Young, et al. 2000). Finally, research focusing on specific types of firms, such 
as family firms (Danco and Jonovic, 1981; Ward and Handy, 1988) or subsidiaries (Leksell and 
Lindgren, 1982; Huse and Rindova, 2001), suggests that the main functions performed by the board 
may vary considerably across corporate forms. 
Collectively, these studies point at the role of contextual or environmental variables in 
affecting the relative salience of the various functions performed by boards of directors. In turn, 
changing salience of board functions may require changes in the way a board is composed, 
structured and managed. If this is true, the application of universal guidelines and prescriptions for 
board design and management, with little regard for the specificity of the focal firm, may be 
questionable. In this respect, we believe that a replication of our study across other corporate forms 
and in other settings may further explore how environmental and contextual variables affect the 
prevailing functions of the board and the appropriate degree of its involvement in strategy, in order to 
develop contingent prescriptions that take into account the specificity of the corporate context.  
In this respect, it may be argued that what we observed might have been affected by the 
cultural and institutional context within which the observed processes occurred. However, there is 
little evidence that this was the case. In six companies out of nine at least one of the shareholders was 
a foreign multinational company and several directors were not locals, which seem to reduce the 
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likelihood of substantial cultural influence on the observed dynamics. Furthermore, the theoretical 
rationale that seems to explain the observed relationships does not appear to be culture-bound, but 
might apply equally well in other cultural contexts. This is not to say that we do not believe that 
peculiar culture and institutions may not affect board dynamics. Indeed, we believe that more 
comparative studies are needed in order to test the robustness of research findings – including ours – 
across national borders. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Our research investigated contextual antecedents of board involvement in strategy-making in mixed-
ownership institutions. Evidence from our study indicate that in the presence of diverging interests 
among represented shareholders, board of directors may facilitate the construction, preservation or 
restoration of consensus regarding the strategic course of the company. In this sense, the board of 
directors participates in the political dimension of the strategic decision process not only as a single 
monolithic entity interacting with top managers, but also as a negotiation forum where an agreement 
between represented shareholders is to be reached before confronting the management. These 
findings expand traditional understandings of the strategic functions of the board and provide further 
support to the idea that the relative salience of the various functions may be contingent upon 
contextual factors. 
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Table I. Description of the firms 
 
Firm Sales 
(.000 €) 
Employees Background information 
Redaelli Tecna 150,000 1,000 Redaelli Tecna was a holding company controlling subsidiaries operating in the metallurgy industry (steel cables for cableways, equipment for the 
production of steel cables, etc.). The equity of the company was distributed among four top managers collectively owning 40% of the shares, an 
institutional investor (Fin2000) with 25% of the shares, and a merchant bank (Sopaf) with 35%. 
Teknecomp 150,000 800 Teknecomp was a holding company whose mission was to acquire undervalued small and medium enterprises, to manage their growth and to sell them. The 
company was controlled by Quattroduedue, a financial holding owned by a coalition of shareholders made by three top managers, a foreign institutional 
investor, and some Italian wealthy families. Our informants did not want to disclose the exact distribution of shareholdings of the company, but confirmed 
that no shareholder owned more than 50%. 
Tecnologistica 100,000 3,200 Tecnologistica was a company operating in the logistic industry with a strong focus on growth. The company was owned by a coalition of shareholders 
made by some top managers with 3% of the shares, an institutional investor (Advent International) with 49% of the shares, a second institutional investor 
(Pechel Industries) with 24% of the shares, a closed fund (Chase Gemina) with 8% of the shares, a second closed fund (Schroeder) with 8% of the shares, 
and an industrial company (Pirelli) with 8% of the shares. 
Polimeri Europa 1,150,000 1,600 Polimeri Europa was a chemical company, leader in Europe in the production of polyethylene. The company was a 50-50 joint venture between Enichem 
(the largest Italian chemical company owned by the State) and Union Carbide (a giant chemical US company). Both mother companies had supply 
relationship with the joint venture: Enichem was a supplier of services and materials (monomers), Union Carbide was a supplier of know-how and 
technology (gas phase Unipol Pe). 
Nylstar 300,000 1,400 Nylstar was a chemical company, leader in Europe in the production of nylon yarn for textiles. The company was a 50-50 joint venture between Snia Fibre 
(the largest Italian producer of artificial fibers) and Rhone Poulenc (a large French chemical company). Rhone Poulenc supplied also raw materials for nylon 
6 and 6.6. 
Olivetti Canon 
Industriale 
250,000 800 Olivetti Canon Industriale was a company producing ink jet printers and photocopiers. The company was a 50-50 joint venture between Olivetti (the 
largest office automation company in Italy) and Canon. Olivetti was both a supplier of technology (technical know-how) and a client. Canon was both a 
supplier of technology (new products) and a client. 
Italtel 1,850,000 15,900 Italtel was a telecommunication company producing equipment such as switching and radio-bridge. The company was a 50-50 joint venture between Stet 
(the largest Italian telecommunication company owned by the State) and Siemens. Stet (Telecom) was by far the main customer of the joint venture, 
Siemens was both a customer and a competitor on other European markets. 
Siemens-Nixdorf 
Informatica 
300,000 900 Siemens Nixdorf Informatica was a large office automation company selling both products (personal computer, server, etc.) and services (design, 
maintenance, etc.). The company was a 50-50 joint venture between Siemens Nixdorf Information Systems A.G. and Stet (the largest Italian 
telecommunication company). Siemens Nixdorf was a supplier of technology (know-how and products), Stet was a large client. 
Telepiù 200,000 1,100 Telepiù was the only broadcasting company selling pay-tv services in Italy. The company was a joint venture between Kirch’s group (a large company in 
the German broadcasting industry), with 45% of the shares; Nethold (a South African company) with 45% of the shares; and Fininvest (the largest private 
broadcasting company in Italy) with 10%. Kirch’s group was a supplier of content and know-how in the broadcasting industry, Nethold was a supplier of 
  
 
 
technology for satellite broadcasting and Fininvest was a supplier of services and also a competitor. 
  
 
 
Table II. Description of the observed decisions 
 
Firm Observed decision Informants and interests 
they represented 
 
Redaelli Tecna A large, long-term contract signed in the US suggested the establishment of an overseas production facility. Top managers 
examined possible alternatives (i.e. to export from European plants or to set up a plant in the US) and took them to the board. The 
board, after having evaluated the alternatives, decided to proceed with the overseas investment. 
 
CEO (shareholder-
manager) 
Director (inst. investor) 
Director (merchant bank) 
 
Teknecomp  A large American corporation disclosed to a general manager of a subsidiary its interest in acquiring the company. Top managers 
of Teknecomp started the negotiation with the American corporation and kept directors informed along the process. Before 
signing the contract, top managers took the decision to the board for its approval. The board approved the decision. 
 
CEO (shareholder-
manager) 
Director (inst. investor) 
Tecnologistica The rapid trend toward the concentration in the logistic industry suggested the need to grow through acquisitions. Top managers 
found an interesting medium-sized and prepared a business plan illustrating the rationale, the timing and the financial implications 
of the operation. Top managers took the decision to the board for its approval and, after having obtained the authorization, signed 
the contract. 
 
CEO (shareholder-
manager) 
Director (inst. investor) 
Polimeri Europa Polimeri Europa was facing an increasing demand requiring an expansion in the production capacity. Top managers of the venture 
explored possible alternatives and decided to build a new production facility, the largest in Europe. Some directors – representing 
the two mother companies – assisted senior managers in developing the final proposal. The board collectively approved the 
proposal during a formal meeting. 
  
CEO (Union Carbide) 
Chairman (Enichem) 
Nylstar In order to reduce production costs, managers proposed to move part of the production to Eastern Europe. A director suggested 
the acquisition of a firm localized in Slovakia. The board decided to create a committee – composed by senior managers of the 
venture and some board members – aimed at collecting further information and preparing a proposal. The committee took the 
different alternatives to the board, which decided to proceed with the investment. 
 
Chairman (SNIA) 
CEO (Rhone Poulenc) 
Olivetti Canon 
Industriale 
The company was facing increasing sales requiring an expansion in the production capacity. During some informal meetings, some 
directors worked in close collaboration with managers from the venture to elaborate possible alternatives and to develop a 
proposal. The proposal was taken to the board for formal approval after the two main representatives of the shareholders – the 
chairman and an outside director – had reached an agreement.  
 
Chairman (Olivetti) 
Director (Canon) 
Italtel During a board meeting, a director representing Siemens proposed to move production to one of the company’s plants. Directors 
representing Stet, however, objected to the proposal and proposed instead to increase the production of the existing plant. No 
decision was taken in the meeting. Some directors representing the two mother companies were delegated the task to analyze the 
Chairman (super partes) 
Director (Stet) 
Director (Siemens) 
  
 
 
problem and to find a consensus on the decision.  
 
Siemens-Nixdorf 
Informatica 
Siemens Nixdorf, as part of its own expansion strategy, was planning to enter to the information service business in Italy, by 
acquiring the related activities of the venture. Some directors – representing the two shareholders – organized informal meetings in 
order to analyze if and how to carry out the operation. They finally decided to create a new company and spin off all the assets 
related to the industry. After having reached a consensus, the directors working on the project took the decision to the board. The 
board approved the decision. 
 
Chairman (super partes) 
CEO (Siemens Nixdorf) 
Telepiù A board member, appointed by Nethold, a potential supplier of technology, proposed the upgrade of the technological platform for 
digital broadcasting. The board delegated the formulation and the evaluation of the possible alternatives to the executive 
committee and to some informal meetings among representatives of the shareholders. When shareholders’ representatives found 
an agreement, the executive committee took the decision to the board. The board approved the decision 
 
CEO (ex Fininvest) 
Director (Nethold) 
Director (Kirch) 
 
  
 
 
Table III. Taking strategic decisions in Type A boards: Some illustrative evidence 
 
 Redaelli Tecna 
 
Teknecomp  Tecnologistica 
Narrow involvement. Boards 
essentially engage in the 
selection of alternatives and in 
the control of the realization 
It is usually a “one man show”: [the CEO] 
presents the board with some plans and 
illustrates them in detail (…) We analyze 
them, discuss them and eventually say yes 
or no (…) (director).  
 
Business plans are elaborated by the 
management […] When plans are developed 
in details, we [the managers] take the 
proposals to the board for its approval 
(CEO).  
 
We [the top managers] quickly discussed 
the proposal, based on some preliminary 
information. Then we informed the board. 
(…) Later, we submitted some sort of 
business plan along with a draft of the 
contract (CEO). 
Prevailing activity: 
Gatekeeping. – i.e. approving 
capital investments 
The board of directors meets rarely, 
basically to approve the balance sheet and 
to take major decisions. […] The CEO 
prepares strategic and financial plans and 
submit them to the board (director). 
 
The board meets only 4-5 times per year to 
approve acquisitions or sales of 
subsidiaries exceeding the amount of 5 
million euros, and to monitor the 
performance of the subsidiaries and the 
holding company (director). 
When we find a target company that we 
believe suits the growth strategy of the 
company, we develop a detailed business 
plan and submit it to the board. (…) If the 
board authorizes it, we carry out the 
acquisition (CEO). 
 
Prevailing decision mechanism: 
Analysis. Managers’ proposals 
are discussed during board 
meetings and evaluated on 
financial grounds 
Recently, we signed a five year contract for 
a large supply in the USA. The size of the 
contract brought us to consider the 
establishment of an overseas production 
facility in order to reduce the transportation 
costs. (…) I was delegated to explore 
possible alternatives and to take them to the 
board for the approval. (…) We discussed 
about commercial and industrial issues, but 
eventually they decided based on the 
discounted cash flow (CEO). 
 
All decisions are usually taken collectively 
after we have circulated all the relevant 
information before and at the meeting. You 
see, we all generally agree that proposals 
should be evaluated on purely financial 
grounds (CEO). 
 
We usually approve or reject proposals 
based on their financial profile. We look at 
ratios like the net present value or the 
internal rate of return (director). 
  
 
 
Table IV. Shaping strategic decisions in Type B boards: Some illustrative evidence 
 
 Polimeri Europa 
 
Nylstar 
Broad  involvement. Board members assist 
managers in the development of alternatives 
and in the implementation of plans  
 
Strategic proposals  are usually initiated by senior managers, 
but later some board members can enter into the process in 
order to help managers to elaborate the details of the plan 
before its formal approval (chairman). 
In order to increase our understanding of the pros and cons 
of the operation, we decided to create a committee that would 
include the general manager and two outside directors, a 
sales manager and an operations manager in the mother 
companies (…) The committee worked for about two months 
collecting information, visiting the site, exploring alternatives, 
etc. (…) Eventually, after having analyzed all the possible 
costs and benefits implicit in each alternative, we presented 
two different proposals to the board, implying different 
combinations of risk and return (CEO).  
 
 
Prevailing activity: Gatekeeping – i.e. 
approving capital investments 
The board meets 6-7 times per year, once to approve the 
balance sheet and the other ones when we [the top 
management] submit investment proposals for the approval 
(…) Their evaluation is usually straightforward and tends to 
focus on the expected impact on the financial results (CEO). 
The board meets four times per year. Three meetings are 
dedicated to review the financial performance of the 
company, to prepare the budget, to organize the presentation 
of financial results to the shareholders, or to approve large 
investments. Then a fourth meeting is usually dedicated to 
evaluate top managers and to choose or nominee new 
managers (chairman). 
 
Prevailing decision mechanism: Analysis. 
Proposals developed by managers in 
collaboration with individual board members 
are brought to the attention of the board and 
evaluated on financial grounds 
 
[Board members’] evaluation tends to focus on the expected 
impact on the financial results. The main objective we have is 
to make money (CEO). 
 
[…] the final decision is usually taken considering essentially 
the impact of the project on the return for the shareholders 
(chairman). 
 
  
 
 
Table V. Shaping the context and content of strategic decisions in Type C boards: Some illustrative evidence 
 
 Siemens Nixdorf Informatica Olivetti Canon Industriale  Italtel Telepiù 
 
Broad involvement. Board 
members often initiate the 
process and assist 
managers in the analysis 
and development of 
alternatives and in the 
implementation of plans 
It is normal for [board members] to 
contribute to the elaboration of 
strategies: some members even tend 
to follow strategic issues more 
closely, outside board meetings 
(chairman). 
  
The available alternatives were 
evaluated with the assistance of 
directors (…) [After the approval of 
the board] managers took care of the 
details, but the same board members 
collaborated to implement the 
strategies (director). 
Eventually, the board delegated some 
members to elaborate a proposal. 
Some high officers of the company 
would assist them. (…) In the next 
meeting the board ratified the 
decision (chairman). 
 
 
At times, some directors may be 
involved in dealing with specific 
issues. […] It depends on their 
background: for example, I was 
called in because of my 
knowledge of regulations and 
institutions (director).  
Prevailing activity: 
Setting the strategic 
context – i.e. defining 
goals and general policies 
 
Analyzing and elaborating strategic 
plans is a primary task of the board. 
(CEO).  
 
 
We would meet periodically to 
discuss about what products to 
develop, how to expand in other 
European markets, and the like 
(chairman). 
During meetings, we spend time 
refining and evaluating the budget 
and the strategic plans, but also 
analyzing and discussing in details 
projects aimed at reducing costs or at 
developing the business (chairman). 
 
The board discusses broad topics: 
marketing policies, technological 
developments, as well as issues of 
capital structure (CEO). 
Prevailing decision 
mechanism: Bargaining. 
Board members frequently 
engage in negotiations, in 
order to reach a 
consensus before 
bringing the decision to 
the board meeting 
 
Usually (…) the final decision is taken 
outside regular meetings and only 
when an agreement is reached 
between the shareholders (chairman). 
 
Having senior managers from both 
partners sitting in the board is crucial: 
they have power to negotiate on 
behalf of mother companies, and 
when they reach an agreement that is 
it (CEO). 
 
Strategic decisions emerged from 
direct relationships between 
shareholders (…) Shareholders had 
identified two main representatives 
(…) When we had found an 
agreement we informed the other 
board members (chairman).  
 
The equilibrium inside the board 
reduces the risk that one shareholder 
takes advantage of the other one. If 
either sponsors a decision that favors 
its interests at the expense of the 
other, the latter has the power to react 
(chairman). 
 
When issues touch specific 
interests of the shareholders, the 
executive committee presents the 
board with a decis ion that has 
been taken elsewhere. They 
involve the rest of the directors 
only after they had found a 
settlement (director). 
 
  
 
 
Table VI. Board composition and the role of directors: Type A boards 
 
Company Board Size Board composition 
Redaelli Tecna  10 1 insider (the CEO, also a shareholder) 
9 decision controllers (a relative of the CEO, two chartered accountants representing the CEO; three executives of the merchant bank, among 
which the Chairman; two academicians and a legal advisor representing the institutional investor)  
Executives from the merchant bank occasionally acted as support specialists on financial operations and acquisitions 
 
Teknecomp  7 2 insiders (the CEO and the general manager, both owning shares in the company) 
5 decision controllers (an executive of an institutional investor, acting as Chairman, a lawyer representing the private families, an executive of a 
bank, two executives in other companies, who may also be considered business experts) 
 
Tecnologistica 8 3 insiders (the CEO, acting also as Chairman, and two managers, all owning shares in the company)  
5 decision controllers (four executives from two institutional investors, one lawyer representing the interests of three minority shareholders) 
 
  
 
 
Table VII. Board composition and the role of directors: Type B and C boards 
 
Company Board Size Board composition 
Polimeri 
Europa 
8 2 insiders (CEO, appointed by Union Carbide, and general manager, appointed by Enichem)  
3 decision controllers / business experts appointed by Enichem, among whom the Chairman (two high officers and one functional manager of the 
mother company)  
3 decision controllers / business experts appointed by Union Carbide (two high officers and one country manager of the mother company)   
 
Nylstar 8 1 insider (Chairman of the joint venture, appointed by SNIA Fibre) 
1 insider (CEO appointed by Rhone Poulenc) 
2 decision controllers / business experts from Rhone Poulenc (the CEO and a sales manager of the mother company) 
2 decision controllers / business experts from SNIA Fibre (the CEO and an operations manager of the mother company) 
2 decision controllers (merchant bankers representing respectively SNIA Fibre and Rhone Poulenc)  
 
Olivetti 
Canon 
Industriale 
8 1 insider (CEO of the joint venture, appointed by Olivetti)  
1 decision controller (financial manager, appointed by Olivetti) 
2 decision controllers / business experts from Olivetti (one acting as Chairman)  
4 decision controllers / business experts from Canon (functional managers in the mother company) 
 
Italtel 9 1 insider (an ex-executive of both mother companies, acting as Chairman, considered super partes by both  shareholders)  
4 decision controllers from Siemens (two of them, functional managers in technology and operations at Siemens, can be considered business experts)  
4 decision controllers  from STET (two of them, functional managers in technology and operations at STET, can be considered business experts)   
 
Siemens-
Nixdorf 
Informatica 
7 1 insider (an ex-executive of both mother companies, acting as Chairman, considered super partes by both shareholders) 
1 insider (general manager, appointed by STET) 
2 decision controllers appointed by STET (one of them, the CEO of STET, can be considered a business expert)  
3 decision controllers appointed by Siemens Nixd orf (one of them, a local country manager of Siemens Nixdorf, can be considered a business expert) 
   
Telepiù 9 1 insider (co-CEO, initially appointed by Fininvest, later confirmed by Nethold) 
1 insider (co-CEO appointed by Nethold) 
1 business expert (a high officer in the Kirch Group, acting as chairman) 
1 business expert appointed by Nethold (an ex-executive and board member in other high-tech companies) 
1 decision controller appointed by Nethold (a lawyer)  
3 decision controllers from the Kirch Group (two of them, a sales manager and a technology manager  can be considered business experts)  
  
 
 
1 decision controller / business expert appointed by Fininvest (a high officer in the mother company) 
  
 
 
Table VIII. Board involvement in strategy: past research and insights from our study 
 
 Agency  Strategic Choice  Resource Dependence  
 
Political  
Central issue 
 
Divergence of interests between 
managers and shareholders; the 
board is a primary mechanism for 
safeguarding shareholders’ 
interests (Fama and Jensen, 1983) 
 
Adaptation to environmental 
changes; the board is a potential 
source of contributions to the 
development, analysis and 
selection of alternative courses of 
action (Andrews, 1980) 
 
Acquisition of critical resources; 
the board is an important 
mechanism for “managing” the 
environment and securing 
institutional support  (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978) 
Reconcilement of multiple interests 
converging on the firm and 
represented in the board; the 
board is a primary mechanism for 
social integration (Hickson, 1987) 
Contribution of outside 
directors  
 
Support for risk-seeking, profit-
oriented strategies 
Imported knowledge about 
managerial practices, business, etc. 
 
Connection with critical resource-
holders and institutional actors 
Representation and safeguard of 
outside interests converging on 
the firm 
 
Contribution of inside 
directors  
 
Support for risk-averse, 
conservative strategies 
 
Firm specific knowledge Cooptation of influential members 
of the community 
Mediation between the interests of 
the firms and those of the 
represented parties  
 
Primary strategic function 
of the board 
 
Monitoring. Ensure that the 
content of corporate strategies is 
aligned with shareholders’ 
interests 
 
Advice. Contribute to the rational 
solution of strategic problems  
 
Environmental linkage. Secure 
the resources and legitimacy 
required to implement strategies 
Consensus building. Facilitate the 
compromise between diverging 
interests about the outcome of 
strategic decisions 
 
Primary antecedents of 
board involvement 
 
Board power relative to the CEO, 
as affected mainly by board 
composition (Baysinger et al., 
1991) and CEO duality (Mallette 
and Fowler, 1992; Zajac and 
Westphal, 1996) 
 
Board members’ possession of 
relevant knowledge (Tashakori and 
Boulton, 1983; Carpenter and 
Westphal, 2001) 
Institutional pressures (Hillmann, 
Cannella and Paetzold, 2000) 
Heterogeneity of represented 
interests  
 
Existence of conflict regulation 
mechanisms  
 
  
 
 
Figure I: Heterogeneous interests and board involvement in strategy: an emerging explanatory 
framework 
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